Accession Number : ADA274019

Title :   Overwhelming Force, Indecisive Victory: The German Invasion of Yugoslavia, 1941

Descriptive Note : Monograph

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Barefield, Michael R.

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Report Date : 13 MAY 1993

Pagination or Media Count : 74

Abstract : The purpose of this monograph is to determine the significant lessons that the German invasion of Yugoslavia in 1941 offers for modern campaign planners when considering operations in that part of the world. The monograph first reviews the history of the invasion in 1941. The monograph then analyzes the campaign from both the German and Yugoslav perspectives using modern operational design criteria. Lastly, the monograph analyzes the lessons to be learned by operational planners from this campaign that are relevant to the conditions that exist today in Yugoslavia. The monograph concludes that Germany, despite its effective military campaign and decisive victory in 1941, failed to create peace for Yugoslavia. Because it did not envision the full scope or uniqueness of the problems that existed in that region of Europe, Germany's victory turned indecisive. Yugoslavia, World War II, Balkans, War plans, Operational art, Campaign, Germany, German army, Yugoslav army.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY, *STRATEGIC ANALYSIS, *OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, *DESIGN CRITERIA, MILITARY OPERATIONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, COMBAT FORCES, YUGOSLAVIA, GERMANY(EAST AND WEST), POLITICAL REVOLUTION, BATTLES, ARMY, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), LESSONS LEARNED, DECISION MAKING

Subject Categories : MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
      MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

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