
Accession Number : AD0267296
Title : ON THE CONVERGENCE OF THE LEARNING PROCESS IN A 2 X 2 NONZEROSUM TWOPERSON GAME
Corporate Author : PRINCETON UNIV N J
Personal Author(s) : MIYASAWA,KOICHI
Report Date : 10 OCT 1961
Pagination or Media Count : 1
Abstract : A problem is presented as follows: Will a learning process give rise to an equilibrium point; that is, will a seque ce of mixed stra egies xk yk oci i a le rning process converge to equilibrium strategies x*, y*, of the game, when k increases infinitely. This is one of the open problems in game theory. (In the case of zerosum twoperson games, the affirmative answer is given.) The purpose in this discussion is to show that the answer to the abov question is affirm iv in he case of m equals n equals 2. (A UTHOR)
Descriptors : *GAME THEORY, LEARNING, MATRICES(MATHEMATICS), NUMERICAL METHODS AND PROCEDURES, STATISTICAL PROCESSES, TRANSFORMATIONS (MATHEMATICS)
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE