Accession Number : AD0267296

Title :   ON THE CONVERGENCE OF THE LEARNING PROCESS IN A 2 X 2 NON-ZERO-SUM TWO-PERSON GAME

Corporate Author : PRINCETON UNIV N J

Personal Author(s) : MIYASAWA,KOICHI

Report Date : 10 OCT 1961

Pagination or Media Count : 1

Abstract : A problem is presented as follows: Will a learning process give rise to an equilibrium point; that is, will a seque ce of mixed stra egies xk yk oci i a le rning process converge to equilibrium strategies x*, y*, of the game, when k increases infinitely. This is one of the open problems in game theory. (In the case of zero-sum two-person games, the affirmative answer is given.) The purpose in this discussion is to show that the answer to the abov question is affirm iv in he case of m equals n equals 2. (A UTHOR)

Descriptors :   *GAME THEORY, LEARNING, MATRICES(MATHEMATICS), NUMERICAL METHODS AND PROCEDURES, STATISTICAL PROCESSES, TRANSFORMATIONS (MATHEMATICS)

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE