Accession Number : AD0432257

Title :   MECHANICS OF SOME LIMITED DISARMAMENT MEASURES. A SIMPLE ECONOMIC TREATMENT,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Ferguson,Allen R.

Report Date : 23 JAN 1961

Pagination or Media Count : 20

Abstract : This paper deals with one small aspect of the rapidly growing field of arms control. Arms control, in current terminology, is considerably broader than disarmament. It embraces all problems ranging from total disarmament to the selective strengthening of armaments to increase the stability of mutual deterrence. Problems of reducing the risk of war and of its devastation if it comes, the mechanics and tactics of negotiation, the politics and technology of inspection, the legal, military and political aspects of enforcement and sanctions, and the hard detailed analysis of the military impact of specific arms-control measures are all subjects of interest, research, and exposition. Although the field has a growing theoretical literature relating arms control to military strategy in general and to deterrence in particular, little has been written on arms limitation as a process relating to the e-onomics of military power. The present paper is addressed to only one specific question: How can disarmament measures affect the economics of military power. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*DISARMAMENT, ECONOMICS), MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING, WEAPONS, WEAPON SYSTEMS, CONTROL

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE