Accession Number : AD0604129

Title :   A SOCIAL EQUILIBRIUM EXISTENCE THEOREM,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Debreu,Gerard

Report Date : 24 APR 1952

Pagination or Media Count : 12

Abstract : In a wide class of social systems each agent has a range of actions among which he selects one. His choice is not however entirely free and the actions of all the other agents determine the subset to which his selection is restricted. Once the action of every agent is given, the outcome of the social activity is known. The preferences of each agent yield his complete ordering of the outcomes and each one of them tries by choosing his action in his restricting subset to bring about the best outcome according to his own preferences. The existence theorem presented here gives general conditions under which there is for such a social system an equilibrium, i.e., a situation where the action of every agent belongs to his restricting subset and no agent has incentive to choose another action.

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, MATHEMATICS), ECONOMICS, SET THEORY, TRANSFORMATIONS

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE