Accession Number : AD0608611

Title :   EXTERNALLY BAYESIAN GROUPS,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Madansky,Albert

Report Date : NOV 1964

Pagination or Media Count : 24

Abstract : Suppose that a group of individuals, each of whom is a Bayesian, is required to make a joint decision, and that although the individuals all agree on the utility function for the problem, they disagree on the prior distribution of the relevant states of nature. An axiom of group rationality is introduced--namely, that to an outsider the decisions of the group appear like the decision of a Bayesian-- and its implications are explored when the group decision-making procedure either can or cannot be amended. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, DECISION MAKING), (*GROUP DYNAMICS, DECISION MAKING), (*DECISION MAKING, GROUP DYNAMICS), PROBABILITY, DECISION THEORY, STATISTICAL FUNCTIONS, DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE