Accession Number : AD0613669

Title :   ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES AMONG FUNCTIONALLY INTERDEPENDENT DEMANDS UNDER PREDOMINANTLY INTANGIBLE CRITERIA,

Corporate Author : CALIFORNIA UNIV LOS ANGELES

Personal Author(s) : Reisman,A. ; Rosenstein,A. B. ; Buffa,E. S.

Report Date : FEB 1965

Pagination or Media Count : 24

Abstract : Concluding remarks: This article recognizes that uncertainty and lack of objectivity exist as conditions under which many decisions relating to the allocation of resources are made. It does not presume to have developed a scientific theory which would eliminate such uncertainty and subjectivity. It does, however, provide a formalism which allows all projects and/or functions to compete for their share of resource allocation on a fair and equivalent, but not equal, basis. Thus, if any cheating, so to speak, is to be done all projects have an equal opportunity to cheat. This formalism can also be used by management in mechanizing such decision operations if these decisions are to be made more than once. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICAL MODELS), (*MANAGEMENT ENGINEERING, DECISION MAKING), BUDGETS, GAME THEORY, BARGAINING, MONEY

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE