Accession Number : AD0617887

Title :   A MODEL OF THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS,

Corporate Author : HAWAII UNIV HONOLULU

Personal Author(s) : Bartos,Otomar J.

Report Date : JAN 1965

Pagination or Media Count : 46

Abstract : A mathematical model of negotiation is described. The basic assumption is that each negotiator always prefers the proposal that has the highest utility for him, the utility being given by the product between payoff and belief in 'acceptability' of the proposal. The belief in acceptability (subjective probability) is, in turn, assumed to change with each speech delivered during the session: it increases whenever a colleague endorses the proposal, decreases whenever a colleague fails to join others in endorsing the proposal. It is shown that the model has some desirable properties; it implies that the most frequently endorsed proposal is always believed to be the most acceptable proposal, that a negotiator who is alone in endorsing a proposal ultimately stops endorsing it, that the negotiator who speaks last has the greatest influence, that the very first speaker always endorses the proposal that has the highest payoff for him, that concession always occurs towards the proposal that has the 'next highest' payoff, and that a majority can assure that the acceptance of any proposal that has non-negative payoff to everybody is achieved. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*BARGAINING, MATHEMATICAL MODELS), (*SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, BARGAINING), GROUP DYNAMICS, GAME THEORY, PROBABILITY, LEARNING, SOCIOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, PERSONALITY, BEHAVIOR

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE