Accession Number : AD0621477

Title :   ON SOME STOCHASTIC TACTICAL ANTISUBMARINE GAMES.

Descriptive Note : Systems research memo.,

Corporate Author : NORTHWESTERN UNIV EVANSTON ILL TECHNOLOGICAL INST

Personal Author(s) : Charnes,A. ; Schroeder,R. G.

Report Date : AUG 1965

Pagination or Media Count : 28

Abstract : In this paper some mathematical models are developed of tactical problems which arise in Antisubmarine Warfare. Specifically, the authors consider a game of pursuit between a hunter-killer force, player 1, and a possible submarine, player 2. The game consists of a sequence of moves and it terminates when player 2 is caught or evades player 1. When the players move they observe the actual tactical configuration of the forces (state) and each player chooses a tactical plan from a finite collection. This joint choice of tactical plans determines an immediate payoff and a transition probability distribution over the states. Hence an expected payoff function is defined. Formally this game is a Terminating Stochastic Game and Shapley demonstrated the existence of a value and optimal strategies (solution). An iterative technique is proposed to approximate the solution to within desired accuracy. Each iteration of the technique is obtained by solving a set of linear programs.

Descriptors :   (*ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE, GAME THEORY), (*TACTICAL WARFARE, ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE), (*STOCHASTIC PROCESSES, GAME THEORY), LINEAR PROGRAMMING, OPTIMIZATION, DECISION THEORY, MILITARY TACTICS

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE