Accession Number : AD0637704

Title :   COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS WITH A CONTINUUM OF TRADERS AND INCOMPLETE PREFERENCES.

Descriptive Note : Research memo.

Corporate Author : HEBREW UNIV JERUSALEM (ISRAEL) DEPT OF MATHEMATICS

Personal Author(s) : Schmeidler,David

Report Date : JUN 1966

Pagination or Media Count : 17

Abstract : It is shown that a market with a continuum of traders possesses a competitive equilibrium even when the preferences are not complete. This generalizes further a result of Aumann, ('Econometrica'; 32: 39-50 (1964); 34: 1-17(1966)) who showed that the convexity assumption may be dispensed within the presence of a continuum of traders. The proof is inspired by the Arrow-Debreu ('Econometrica; 22: 265-290(1954)) proof for the finite case. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*ECONOMICS, *GAME THEORY), STABILITY, COMMERCE, THEOREMS, ISRAEL

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE