Accession Number : AD0687434

Title :   ON THE CORE OF AN ECONOMIC SYSTEM WITH EXTERNALITIES,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Shapley,Lloyd S. ; Shubik,Martin

Report Date : APR 1969

Pagination or Media Count : 28

Abstract : The document covers an investigation of the social stability of joint undertakings to allocate costs or benefits of the external effects of productive economic activity. Social stability is taken to mean that all coalitions or potential coalitions of affected parties are satisfied simultaneously. This is equivalent to being in the core of the corresponding multiperson game. A number of simple pollution-type models that have a wide diversity of core behavior are examined. Tax and subsidy schemes are discussed in regard to their potential for the achievement of Pareto optimality in the face of externalities of both types. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*ECONOMICS, *GAME THEORY), GROUP DYNAMICS, STABILITY, COSTS, OPTIMIZATION, MATHEMATICAL MODELS, INEQUALITIES, STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTIONS

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE