Accession Number : AD0690066

Title :   PAETO OPTIMALALITY UNDER UNCERTAINTY: SUBJECTIVITY, EFFICIENCY, AND SIMILARITY OF BELIEFS.

Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,

Corporate Author : HARVARD UNIV CAMBRIDGE MASS

Personal Author(s) : Starr,Ross M.

Report Date : OCT 1968

Pagination or Media Count : 33

Abstract : The paper investigates the conditions under which general equilibrium under uncertainty leads to ex post Pareto optimality. When the conditions are fulfilled uncertainty creates no mis-allocation of resources. The negation of these conditions therefore indicates when information will promote inefficiency. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*COMMERCE, UNCERTAINTY), (*ECONOMICS, DECISION MAKING), STATISTICAL ANALYSIS, MATHEMATICAL PREDICTION, INEQUALITIES, OPTIMIZATION

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE