Accession Number : AD0694973
Title : NONZERO-SUM DIFFERENTIAL GAMES: CONCEPTS AND MODELS.
Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,
Corporate Author : HARVARD UNIV CAMBRIDGE MASS DIV OF ENGINEERING AND APPLIED PHYSICS
Personal Author(s) : Starr,Alan W.
Report Date : JUN 1969
Pagination or Media Count : 153
Abstract : A general class of differential games, where the N players try to minimize different cost criteria by controlling inputs to a single dynamic system, is investigated as an extension of optimal control theory. Dropping the usual zero-sum assumption makes it possible to model a more realistic class of competitive situations where mutual interest is important. The nonzero-sum formulation has several interesting analytic and conceptual features not found in zero-sum differential games. It is no longer obvious what should be demanded of a 'solution,' and three types of solution concepts are discussed: Nash equilibrium, minimax, and noninferior (or Pareto optimal) strategies. For one special case, the 'linear-quadratic' differential game, all of these solutions can be computed exactly by solving sets of coupled ordinary matrix differential equations. Some simple examples are solved, and series of more difficult but more realistic nonzero-sum differential game situations are presented (but not solved) for models of economic oligopoly, advertising policy, labor-management negotiations, and international trade. (Author)
Descriptors : (*GAME THEORY, DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS), MATHEMATICAL MODELS, OPTIMIZATION, CONTROL SYSTEMS, ECONOMICS
Subject Categories : Operations Research
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE