Accession Number : AD0706916

Title :   ON BEHAVIOR STRATEGY SOLUTIONS OF FINITE TWO-PERSON CONSTANT-SUM EXTENDED GAMES,

Corporate Author : PURDUE UNIV LAFAYETTE IND SCHOOL OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING

Personal Author(s) : Utgoff,V. A. ; Kashyap,R. L.

Report Date : FEB 1970

Pagination or Media Count : 40

Abstract : Through the introduction of a concept called recall-sensitivity, it is demonstrated that perfect recall (each player remembers all of its past actions and past knowledge of the other player's and nature's actions) is a sufficient but not a necessary condition for the existence of behavior strategy solutions and epsilon-solutions in finite two-person constant-sum extended games. A method is presented by which behavior strategies meeting a necessary condition for solutions or epsilon-solutions may be generated. Comments are made on the practical implications of the material presented. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, ALGORITHMS), DECISION MAKING, PROBABILITY DENSITY FUNCTIONS, UNCERTAINTY

Subject Categories : Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE