Accession Number : AD0709535

Title :   OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTING: A CONSTRAINED GAME THEORY MODEL,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Midler,Joseph L.

Report Date : JUN 1970

Pagination or Media Count : 19

Abstract : Several versions of the negotiation of the parameters of incentive contracts between a government and private contractors are formulated as game theoretical models. This framework permits one focus upon a number of aspects that have previously been overlooked such as the interaction of the participants, the lack of domination by one side or the other, constraints upon the player's strategies, and the possible joint interests of the one party in the other player's outcome. Computational methods of solution are suggested. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, CONTRACTS), UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, INDUSTRIES, MATHEMATICAL MODELS, OPTIMIZATION, BARGAINING, NONLINEAR PROGRAMMING, MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL

Subject Categories : Administration and Management
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE