Accession Number : AD0710271

Title :   QUEUEING THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CONTRACTORS' SEQUENTIAL BIDDING PROBLEMS. I,

Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CALIF

Personal Author(s) : Zacks,Leonard H.

Report Date : JUL 1970

Pagination or Media Count : 31

Abstract : One considers here the bidding problem of a contractor with a fixed amount of resources producing products under time incentive contracts. A time incentive or schedule incentive contract is a function T(xi), xi epsilon (0, infinity), which specifies that a contractor will receive a payment T(xi) if he completes the product xi time units after he was awarded the contract. The contractor simultaneously services a number of such contracts, so that whenever a new RFP arrives, the contractor will have his fixed resources spread among a number of contracts in various stages of completion. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*QUEUEING THEORY, CONTRACTS), (*CONTRACTS, SEQUENCES(MATHEMATICS)), MATRICES(MATHEMATICS), MATHEMATICAL MODELS, OPTIMIZATION, COSTS

Subject Categories : Administration and Management
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE