Accession Number : AD0710749

Title :   PRICE DUOPOLY AND CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS,

Corporate Author : YALE UNIV NEW HAVEN CONN COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS

Personal Author(s) : Levitan,Richard ; Shubik,Martin

Report Date : 17 JUL 1970

Pagination or Media Count : 22

Abstract : The paper examines an extremely simple model of a duopoly situation in which the two firms compete with price as the strategic variable and in which the firms are limited by capacity constraints. Some of the important developments of duopoly theory concerned with the existence of equilibrium is reviewed. Such a market, as Edgeworth showed, does not in general have an equilibrium. It is shown that the model described in the report has a rather simply described equilibrium in mixed strategies.

Descriptors :   (*ECONOMICS, MATHEMATICAL MODELS), MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL, GAME THEORY, COMMERCE, MATRICES(MATHEMATICS), NUMERICAL ANALYSIS

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE