Accession Number : AD0746550

Title :   Core-Stem Solutions of N-Person Essential Games.

Descriptive Note : Research rept.,

Corporate Author : TEXAS UNIV AUSTIN CENTER FOR CYBERNETIC STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Charnes,A. ; Littlechild,S. ; Sorensen,S.

Report Date : FEB 1972

Pagination or Media Count : 29

Abstract : A new wide class of internally stable solutions to essential n-person games in characteristic function form, 'core-stem' solutions, is herein derived based on the notion of 'core of a coalition' and a finite sequence of meta-games (a'stem of games') with a 'stem level' solution for each meta-level. Core-stem solutions exist for every game, can differ according to different stems selected or different stem-level solutions selected. An example with an implausible core and plausible core-stem solution (two different stems) is presented. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, PROBLEM SOLVING), SET THEORY, BARGAINING, THEOREMS

Subject Categories : Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE