Accession Number : AD0754384

Title :   Auctions: Markets with Indivisible Goods and Quasi-Passive Sellers.

Descriptive Note : Research rept.,

Corporate Author : NEW YORK UNIV N Y DEPT OF ECONOMICS

Personal Author(s) : Hotter,Andrew S.

Report Date : DEC 1972

Pagination or Media Count : 78

Abstract : The paper applies the methodology of the Modern Theory of Social choice and game theory to the problem of allocating goods using bidding and auctioning rules. Three bidding rules are studied to see whether they satisfy a set of minimal criteria. (Author)

Descriptors :   (*COMMERCE, *BARGAINING), (*GAME THEORY, THEOREMS), DECISION THEORY, BUDGETS, MONEY, SET THEORY, GRAPHICS

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
      Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE