Accession Number : AD0754384
Title : Auctions: Markets with Indivisible Goods and Quasi-Passive Sellers.
Descriptive Note : Research rept.,
Corporate Author : NEW YORK UNIV N Y DEPT OF ECONOMICS
Personal Author(s) : Hotter,Andrew S.
Report Date : DEC 1972
Pagination or Media Count : 78
Abstract : The paper applies the methodology of the Modern Theory of Social choice and game theory to the problem of allocating goods using bidding and auctioning rules. Three bidding rules are studied to see whether they satisfy a set of minimal criteria. (Author)
Descriptors : (*COMMERCE, *BARGAINING), (*GAME THEORY, THEOREMS), DECISION THEORY, BUDGETS, MONEY, SET THEORY, GRAPHICS
Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE