Accession Number : AD0763670

Title :   Asymptotic Stability and Other Properties of Trajectories and Transfer Sequences Leading to the Bargaining Sets.

Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,

Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CALIF DEPT OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH

Personal Author(s) : Kalai,Gill ; Maschler,Michael ; Owen,Guillermo

Report Date : MAR 1973

Pagination or Media Count : 44

Abstract : The foundation of a dynamic theory for the bargaining sets started in another paper, where Stearns constructed transfer sequences which always converge to appropriate bargaining sets. A continuous analogue was developed by Billera, where sequences were replaced by solutions of systems of differential equations. In the paper the authors show that the nucleolus is locally asymptotically stable both with respect to Stearns' sequences and Billera's solutions if and only if it is an isolated point of the appropriate bargaining set. No other point of the bargaining set can be locally asymptotically stable. (Modified author abstract)

Descriptors :   (*GAME THEORY, BARGAINING), DIFFERENTIAL EQUATIONS, SET THEORY, VECTOR SPACES, THEOREMS

Subject Categories : Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE