Accession Number : AD0779135

Title :   Prior Solutions: Extensions of Convex Nucleus Solutions to Chance-Constrained Games.

Descriptive Note : Research rept.,

Corporate Author : TEXAS UNIV AUSTIN CENTER FOR CYBERNETIC STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Charnes,A. ; Granot,Daniel

Report Date : OCT 1973

Pagination or Media Count : 28

Abstract : The theory of n-person cooperative game in characteristic function form is extended to games with stochastic characteristic function, where the values that the characteristic function assigns to the various coalitions are random variables with given distribution functions. Based on the idea of zero order decision rules, the authors define classes of 'prior' solutions. As 'prior' solutions, they here extend the classic notions of core, Shapley value and nucleolus to these stochastic games and investigate their properties. (Modified author abstract)

Descriptors :   *Game theory, Nonlinear programming, Distribution functions, Stochastic processes, Set theory, Optimization, Theorems

Subject Categories : Operations Research

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE