Accession Number : AD0780003

Title :   Credible Deterrence in a Salt Environment.

Descriptive Note : Student essay,

Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s) : Williams,William M. , Jr

Report Date : 07 SEP 1973

Pagination or Media Count : 30

Abstract : Two questions arise from the SALT agreements: How do they affect the 'sufficiency' theory, and what would be a credible deterrence under these agreements. The flaws of the SALT agreements have been examined in light of U.S. deterrent strength. The U.S. 'Nuclear Sufficiency' theory is examined under the current SALT agreements. The author's recommendations are in two parts. The first is on a credible deterrence under the SALT agreements, and is basically continued development and deployment of those weapon systems allowed under the agreements. The second recommendation concerns the current SALT II talks. Here, consideration should be given for U.S. allies, no give-in to the Soviets for the sake of arms control headlines, and the U.S. must have a credible deterrence and an indication of the will to use it if the need arises. (Modified author abstract)

Descriptors :   *Arms control, *Deterrence, United States government, Foreign policy

Subject Categories : Government and Political Science

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE