Accession Number : ADA017050
Title : Nuclear Strategy for Defending a Border.
Descriptive Note : Military issues research memo.,
Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL STRATEGIC STUDIES INST CARLISLE BARRACKS PA
Personal Author(s) : Scott,John F.
Report Date : 29 OCT 1975
Pagination or Media Count : 28
Abstract : The study deals with the dilemma of using nuclear weapons with restraint to convey incentives to a nuclear opponent to terminate war, while recognizing that the nuclear use may be an incentive to escalate or otherwise continue a war. Analysis centers on the choice of how much nuclear force to use, when, and why. Offered as critical variables are possible aggressor motivations and the possibility of unintended war and crisis. The paper concludes that any nuclear deterrence strategy can have the potential for its own failure primarily by ignoring requirements to encourage stability in crises rather than preventive or reemptive war. A strong conventional defense option in Europe is seen as still necessary for deterrence with stability.
Descriptors : *Deterrence, *Military strategy, *Nuclear weapons, Conflict, Stability, Management
Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE