Accession Number : ADA019766

Title :   On Stochastic Dynamic Stackelberg Strategies,

Corporate Author : MASSACHUSETTS INST OF TECH CAMBRIDGE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS LAB

Personal Author(s) : Castanon,David ; Athans,Michael

Report Date : AUG 1975

Pagination or Media Count : 9

Abstract : Feedback Stackelberg strategies are considered for two person linear multistage games with quadratic performance criteria and noisy measurements. Explicit solutions are given when the information sets are nested; the solutions are closely related to the 'separation theorem' of stochastic control. (Author)

Descriptors :   *Control theory, *Set theory, *Stochastic processes, *Game theory, Separation, Theorems, Decision theory, Feedback

Subject Categories : Statistics and Probability

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE