Accession Number : ADA114088

Title :   The Effect of UI Administrative Screening on Job Search.

Descriptive Note : Research contribution,


Personal Author(s) : Jacobson,Louis ; Schwarz-Miller,Ann

PDF Url : ADA114088

Report Date : Jun 1981

Pagination or Media Count : 38

Abstract : Unemployment insurance (UI) is intended to help people who are temporarily unemployed and seeking suitable employment. It is not intended for individuals who are unable or unwilling to work. This paper examines the degree to which screening reduces unemployment and whether the screening procedures used are appropriately targeted on individuals who have little interest in returning to work. The primary focus is on the work test which is a form of screening designed to determine if an otherwise qualified individual is actively seeking suitable work. Two effects of work test screening are examined by studying denial of benefits: the direct effect of denying benefits to those found not to be searching and the indirect or deterrent effect on the claimant population as a whole. Separate models are estimated to examine each effect using and unusually detailed microdata base for a sample of 700 claimants in Arizona during the period 1967-69. The key conclusion of the study is that the threat of a severe penalty i.e., the long term disqualification of a claimant, encourages a substantially faster return to, at least, part-time work. This finding explains why earlier, more aggregative, studies showed that small increases in denial rates were correlated with large reductions in unemployment. In addition, we concluded that a mild penalty, i.e., a disqualification with no loss of benefit entitlement, was too weak to have measurable effects.

Descriptors :   *Benefits, *Unemployment, Requirements, Reduction, Qualifications

Subject Categories : Administration and Management

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE