Accession Number : ADA118702

Title :   Why the Short-War Scenario is Wrong for Naval Planning.

Descriptive Note : Professional paper,

Corporate Author : CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA NAVAL STUDIES GROUP

Personal Author(s) : Hall,John V

PDF Url : ADA118702

Report Date : Jul 1982

Pagination or Media Count : 16

Abstract : Is it sensible to plan U.S. naval forces for a short war with the USSR? This paper argues that the answer is a firm, clear 'no.' The discussion focuses on conflict duration. If a war occurred in Europe, then no matter what course the war followed, the United States could expect to find itself involved in a long struggle in which general-purpose naval forces would be vital. The major possibilities seem to be: (1) Avoidance of nuclear war coupled with continued NATO resistance, leading to a long conventional war; (2) Avoidance of nuclear war and collapse of European resistance, leading to a world in which the United States would have to pursue its interests without European allies; and (3) Escalation to nuclear war, followed by a long and dangerous period of reconstitution during which naval forces could be essential to the survival of the United States as a nation. In each case, there would be time to generate national power. But the standing forces (and planned residual forces) should include essential items that otherwise might require years to produce. The main issue in this case is: does the USSR have a strategy to dominate Europe and continue its expansion by means other than direct attack? And if so, does Soviet strategy involve 'diplomacy of force?' We may hope the answer to at least one of these questions is 'no.' But the evidence does not point that way.

Descriptors :   *Warfare, Short range(Time), Scenarios, Naval planning

Subject Categories : Naval Surface Warfare

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE