
Accession Number : ADA131220
Title : ProfitSharing in a Collusive Industry,
Corporate Author : YALE UNIV NEW HAVEN CT COWLES FOUNDATION FOR RESEARCH IN ECONOMICS
Personal Author(s) : Osborne, Martin J ; Pitchik, Carolyn
PDF Url : ADA131220
Report Date : 09 Jun 1983
Pagination or Media Count : 26
Abstract : The author studied a model in which collusive duopolists divide up the monopoly profit according to their relative bargaining power. They are particularly interested in how the negotiated profit shares depend on the sizes of the firms. If each can produce at the same constant unit cost up to its capacity, we show that the profit per unit of capacity of the small firm is higher than that of the large one. also studied is how the ratio of the negotiated profits depends on the size of demand relative to industry capacity, and how this ratio changes with variations in demand. (Author)
Descriptors : *ECONOMIC MODELS, *MATHEMATICAL MODELS, *PROFITS, *REVENUE SHARING, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, BARGAINING, INDUSTRIES, PREDICTIONS
Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis
Numerical Mathematics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE