Accession Number : ADA131568

Title :   Models of Accession and Retention

Descriptive Note : Professional paper

Corporate Author : CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES ALEXANDRIA VA NAVAL STUDIES GROUP

Personal Author(s) : Clay-Mendez, Deborah

PDF Url : ADA131568

Report Date : Oct 1982

Pagination or Media Count : 9

Abstract : In this paper, we outline two simple models that integrate accession and first-term retention policies. The first model describes the relation between optimal accession and first-term reenlistment bonus policies when marginal recruiting costs are constant. It is appropriate for the analyst who is concerned with the bonus policy for a single, relatively small rating or for the analyst dealing with a group whose supply is demand determined. Using this model, we find that optimal reenlistment bonus levels will be the highest in ratings which have high first-term attrition, high training costs, and which would have low reenlistment rates in the absence of bonuses. We also find that optimal bonus levels rise as military wages fall relative to civilian wages. The second model is similar to the first, but takes account of the fact that marginal recruiting costs rise as more recruits are obtained. Because of this, we find that a larger Navy implies higher optimal reenlistment bonus levels even in the long run.

Descriptors :   *COST MODELS, *NAVAL PERSONNEL, *PERSONNEL RETENTION, *PERSONNEL SELECTION, ATTRITION, COST ESTIMATES, FRINGE BENEFITS, INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, MANPOWER, MILITARY FORCE LEVELS, MILITARY REQUIREMENTS, NAVAL PLANNING, RECRUITING, REENLISTMENT, SALARIES

Subject Categories : Personnel Management and Labor Relations

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE