Accession Number : ADA131636
Title : On the Optimality of Individual Behavior in First Come Last Served Queues with Preemption and Balking.
Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,
Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA CENTER FOR RESEARCH ON ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY
Personal Author(s) : Hassin,Rafael
PDF Url : ADA131636
Report Date : May 1983
Pagination or Media Count : 20
Abstract : In this paper the following queueing system is investigated: A single server facility operates on a First Come First Served (FCFS) basis with Poisson arrivals and exponential service distribution. An arriving customer may either join the end of the queue or he may chose to balk at no cost. It is assumed that a customer who balks never returns to the system. Customers are risk neutral, have identical cost per unit of service and waiting time, and receive a given identical benefit at the instant of their service completion. Since waiting time is an increasing function of the queue length, and since service time is exponentially distributed, customers' behavior is of a control limit type: There is a reservation length (equivalent to the reservation wage concept in Search Theory) such that an arriving customer joins the queue if and only if the queue is shorter than this value. Moreover, Naor's assumptions guarantee that a customer who joins the queue will not balk at a latter time since his position in the queue is secured and since the exponential distribution possesses the memoryless property .
Descriptors : *Queueing theory, Optimization, Behavior, Poisson ratio
Subject Categories : Operations Research
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE