Accession Number : ADA136472

Title :   An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value.

Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,

Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA INST FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Personal Author(s) : Aumann,R J

PDF Url : ADA136472

Report Date : Sep 1983

Pagination or Media Count : 30

Abstract : The NTU (Non-Transferable Utility) Value is a solution concept for multiperson cooperative games in which utility is not transferable (games without side payments). Introduced by Shapley in (1969), it generalizes his (1953) value for TU (Transferable Utility) games. Many economic contexts are more naturally modelled by NTU than by TU games; and indeed, the NTU value has been applied with some success to a variety of economic and economic-political models. Two well-known applications are Nash's solutions (1950, 1953) for the bargaining problem and for two-person cooperative games, both of which are instances of the NTU value. In this paper, the author offers an axiomatization of the NTU value. Like any axiomatization, it should enable us to understand the concept better, and hence to focus discussion. One can now view the NTU value as defined by the axioms, with the treatment in Shapley (1969) serving as a formula or method of calculation. Thus the NTU value joins the ranks of the TU value and Nash's solution to the bargaining problem, each of which is defined by axioms, but usually calculated by a formula -- a formula whose intuitive significance is not, on the face of it, entirely clear.

Descriptors :   *Game theory, *Value, Mathematical logic, Solutions(General), Set theory, Vector analysis, Theorems, Economic models, Political science

Subject Categories : Theoretical Mathematics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE