Accession Number : ADA163197

Title :   Game-Theoretic Analysis of Trading Processes.

Descriptive Note : Technical rept.,

Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA INST FOR MATHEMATICAL STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Personal Author(s) : Wilson,Robert

PDF Url : ADA163197

Report Date : Aug 1985

Pagination or Media Count : 68

Abstract : Three topics are discussed. The first is a research program to establish whether the familiar trading rules, such as sealed-bid and oral double auctions, are incentive efficient over a wide class of economic environments. The second is a review of recent studies of dynamic trading processes, and particularly the effects of impatience and private information on the timing and terms of trade; the main emphasis is on models of bilateral bargaining. The third considers prospects for embedding bargaining and auction models in larger environments so as to endogenize traders' impatience as a consequence of competitive pressures; models of dispersed matching and bargaining and a model of oral bid-ask markets are mentioned. (Author)

Descriptors :   *ECONOMIC MODELS, ENVIRONMENTS, DISPERSING, ECONOMICS, MODELS, TIME, PRESSURE, EMBEDDING, MATCHING, GAME THEORY, BARGAINING

Subject Categories : Economics and Cost Analysis

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE