Accession Number : ADA299016

Title :   The U.S. Army's Mechanized Cavalry Doctrine in World War II.

Descriptive Note : Master's thesis 2 Aug 94-2 Jun 95,

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s) : DiMarco, Louis A.

PDF Url : ADA299016

Report Date : 02 JUN 1995

Pagination or Media Count : 168

Abstract : This study focuses on doctrine of the U.S. Army's mechanized cavalry during World War II. The study identifies how and why doctrine proved inadequate for actual battlefield conditions. The North African Campaign demonstrated that the doctrine had only limited application to the World War II battlefield. Combat experience revealed that cavalry missions were not limited to reconnaissance, which constituted the main mission under mechanized cavalry doctrine, but included the complete range of traditional horse cavalry missions as well. Combat further revealed that cavalry had to fight to gain information. Although doctrine was adjusted during the war, the published tactical and operational concepts never caught up with the reality of the battlefield. The campaign in Northwest Europe confirmed many of the lessons learned in North Africa, and revealed the importance of the corps cavalry groups to corps level maneuver. The published mechanized cavalry doctrine of World War II did not meet the needs of the battlefield, yet the cavalry's combat record in World War II was impressive. This record of success, and the reasons for it, are still relevant to modern armored cavalry as well as to future Force XXI Army designs and concepts.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *CAVALRY, WARFARE, GLOBAL, LESSONS LEARNED, BATTLEFIELDS, MISSIONS, MANEUVERS, ARMY, MILITARY TACTICS, RECONNAISSANCE, ARMORED VEHICLES, CORPS LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS, NORTH AFRICA, MECHANIZATION, HORSES.

Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE