Accession Number : ADA299271

Title :   Maneuver Warfare at Sea: A Historical Review.

Descriptive Note : Master's thesis, 2 Aug 94-2 Jun 95,

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS

Personal Author(s) : Piercey, Patrick A.

PDF Url : ADA299271

Report Date : 02 JUN 1995

Pagination or Media Count : 120

Abstract : This study investigates the historical basis of maneuver warfare at sea to answer the question: Does the adoption of maneuver warfare by the U.S. Navy improve its ability to carry out its roles and functions in support of the national military strategy? The fundamental maneuver warfare concept examined is that maneuver warfare seeks the psychological defeat of the enemy by destroying his cohesion and will to resist through disruption of his decision cycle by presenting cascading and unexpected threatening situations by assailing his center of gravity at a tempo at which he cannot respond. Two historical case studies are examined at the operational level: the Trafalgar Campaign of 1805 and the Falklands/Malvinas War of 1982. Analysis of both reveals evidence of the application of maneuver warfare concepts. The study concludes that maneuver warfare has a foundation in naval history. Maneuver warfare on both land and sea seek the psychological defeat of the enemy, primarily that of the commander. As such, maneuver warfare is a viable doctrine for the U.S. Navy.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY, *NAVAL WARFARE, *MANEUVERS, CENTER OF GRAVITY, MILITARY STRATEGY, LESSONS LEARNED, DECISION MAKING, MILITARY DOCTRINE, NAVY, THESES, CYCLES, CASE STUDIES, VIABILITY, PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE, FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Subject Categories : Naval Surface Warfare

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE