Accession Number : ADA300986
Title : Plus CA Change, Plus C'Est La Meme Chose (The More Things Change, The More They Stay the Same) The Difficulty in Increasing Operational Movement Rates.
Descriptive Note : Monograph,
Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES
Personal Author(s) : McCarthy, Thomas C.
PDF Url : ADA300986
Report Date : 19 MAY 1995
Pagination or Media Count : 76
Abstract : The movement of major combat, combat support, and combat service support units to the decisive place and time on the battlefield is the commander's operational art. Effectively integrating, controlling, and supporting motor, rail, air, and water modes of intratheater transportation is science. Despite the greater speed of the vehicles, trains, aircraft, and ships involved, statistical comparisons between World War II and Korean War campaigns and recent actions in similar terrain indicate U.S. corps have not improved their ability to conduct operational movements. In desert terrain, Operation DESERT STORM's VII and XVIII Corps did not move to their forward assembly areas any faster than elements of First Army or U Corps did during Operation TORCH. In urban terrain, REFORGER's III Corps did not move faster than its predecessor during the Ardennes offensive. In mountainous terrain, time-distance analysis shows that an armored reinforcing corps could not move from port to sector as rapidly as X Corps did in defending the Line D. Deficiencies in doctrine, equipment, organization, and training inhibit corps from increasing their movement rate. Current U.S. Army doctrine is not specific or holistic enough to be treated as a science. Doctrine becomes more vague as movements become more complex. Doctrine does not prescribe equipment, organization, and training necessary to support faster movements. Equipment deficiencies complicate movement control, Systematic large- unit training, which peaked with the semi-annual REFORGER exercises in the l980s, has declined. Computer exercises and the battle command training program in particular, have not compensated for the loss of large-scale field training exercises.
Descriptors : *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *COMBAT SUPPORT, *ARMY OPERATIONS, VELOCITY, CONTROL, TRANSPORTATION, WARFARE, FORWARD AREAS, GLOBAL, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, COMPUTATIONS, AIRCRAFT, TRAINING, CAPACITY(QUANTITY), BATTLEFIELDS, COMPUTERS, WATER, RATES, TERRAIN, TIME, MOUNTAINS, INTERNAL, PLANNING, COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, DEFICIENCIES, OPERATION, STORMS, LOGISTICS, MILITARY TRAINING, VEHICLES, ASSEMBLY, KOREA, MILITARY COMMANDERS, BATTLES, DESERTS, MOTORS, MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS, FIELD CONDITIONS, URBAN AREAS.
Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE