Accession Number : ADA307422
Title : Operational Fires, Modern Doctrine, and Amphibious Operations.
Descriptive Note : Final rept.,
Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI
Personal Author(s) : Sansone, Rodman D.
PDF Url : ADA307422
Report Date : 12 FEB 1996
Pagination or Media Count : 34
Abstract : Today's war fighters can longer afford to think solely in tactical terms. War fighters must be able to think strategically, operationally, and tactically. Unfortunately, many officers are not taught how to think and fight operationally. The confusion exists partly due to our doctrine. All of the Services agree on the definition of operational art but there is little agreement on what defines a critical operating system. The Army defines six operating systems, the Marine Corps has seven, and the Navy four. The Services have, in some respects, recognized 'operational fires' as a critical capability. The Army recognizes it as a separate operating system, while the Marine Corps currently places fires under the operating system of maneuver. The Navy, on the other hand, calls it power projection. No doubt, confusion abounds due to the Services inability to standardize terminology. Joint doctrine has helped to some degree in the standardization process but more effort is needed. Operational fires are particular useful in the conduct of amphibious operations. History has demonstrated the value of operational fires in amphibious operations. The invasion of Leyte and Saipan Islands during World War II are two examples presented in this paper. Furthermore, amphibious forces are 'lock-openers' whose ability is directly influenced through the use of operational fires.
Descriptors : *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), MARINE CORPS, JET FIGHTERS, STANDARDIZATION, MANEUVERS, POWER, FIRES, AGREEMENTS.
Subject Categories : Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE