Accession Number : ADA308747

Title :   Strategic Forum. Number 73. Operation SEA SIGNAL: U.S. Military Support for Caribbean Migration Emergencies, May 1994 to February 1996,

Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Bentley, David

PDF Url : ADA308747

Report Date : MAY 1996

Pagination or Media Count : 4

Abstract : Both Haitian and Cuban migration flows during this emergency were prompted by a migrant perception that the risk of a hazardous sea voyage was justified by an increased chance of reaching the United States. Just as with the Mariel boatlift of 1980, and the Haitian exodus of 1991 and 1992, the 'pull' factor of perceived opportunity was much more significant than the 'push' factor of miserable conditions in Cuba or Haiti. Immigration and refugee matters are not the normal responsibility of the military, but military support for migration emergencies that exceed the capabilities of civilian agencies is an appropriate task. Nonetheless, involvement of active military forces in the routine support of immigration and refugee matters should be avoided because it distracts forces from their principal mission of defense and readiness. SEA SIGNAL was an unqualified military success. Military forces were not specifically trained in migrant support missions, but the long term investment in capable forces, quality people, and development of resourceful leaders was a significant contribution to the success of SEA SIGNAL.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, *CUBA, *MIGRATION, *REFUGEES, *HAITI, UNITED STATES, EMERGENCIES, RISK, DEFENSE SYSTEMS, MISSIONS, FLOW, MILITARY PUBLICATIONS, PERIODICALS, WEST INDIES, CARIBBEAN SEA.

Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Sociology and Law
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE