Accession Number : ADA309192

Title :   Flawed Decisions: The Korean War, September - November 1950.

Descriptive Note : Research rept.,

Corporate Author : ARMY WAR COLL CARLISLE BARRACKS PA

Personal Author(s) : Kerr, Charles E.

PDF Url : ADA309192

Report Date : APR 1996

Pagination or Media Count : 29

Abstract : In the months following North Korea's invasion of South Korea, United Nations forces fought back from near defeat to the brink of victory. General MacArthur received high praise for the successful amphibious assault at Inchon. This paper argues that his decision making after Inchon, between 15 September and late November 1950, was flawed and led to the selection of an inappropriate course of action for operations in North Korea. The paper questions General MacArthur's failure to pursue the nearly defeated North Korean forces, his decision to leave Eighth Army and X Corps as separate commands, and the fatal decision to advance his forces to the Manchurian border. Further, this paper argues that General MacArthur's success at Inchon, created an atmosphere in which his superiors hesitated to question his decision making.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY, *MILITARY STRATEGY, *DECISION MAKING, *KOREA, *MILITARY COMMANDERS, *JUDGEMENT(PSYCHOLOGY), MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), NORTH KOREA, MILITARY OPERATIONS, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), ATTITUDES(PSYCHOLOGY), AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS, FAILURE, UNITED NATIONS, SOUTH KOREA.

Subject Categories : Humanities and History
      Psychology
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE