Accession Number : ADA310489
Title : Verifying Nonproliferation Treaties: Obligation, Process, and Sovereignty,
Corporate Author : NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIV WASHINGTON DC INST FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES
Personal Author(s) : Kessler, J. C.
PDF Url : ADA310489
Report Date : OCT 1995
Pagination or Media Count : 154
Abstract : The foregoing chapters examine what verification is and why states would bother with so difficult and politically sensitive an issue when negotiating agreements on arms control and disarmament issues. Now it is necessary to confront the question of whether there are any meaningful conclusions to be drawn from this exercise. Are the patterns discerned in the history of these treaties meaningful for understanding how other treaties have evolved or will evolve? Are there lessons here which might benefit future negotiators? This final chapter seeks to provide some answers, albeit partial ones, to these questions. There are in fact several interesting and potentially important conclusions to be drawn. Verification of multilateral treaty obligations contains its own intrinsic structure and logic, independent of the obligations undertaken by the parties and the political context in which those undertakings are negotiated and made. The many significant similarities in the verification processes for the CFE Treaty, the NPT, and the CWC demonstrate the degree to which there is such an underlying structure regardless of whether the behavior or activity is strictly military or has essentially civilian dimensions, whether all relevant states participate or only some of the most important states agree from the beginning to participate, and whether the agreement is global or regional in scope. p. 136
Descriptors : *ARMS CONTROL, *TREATIES, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, POLITICAL SCIENCE, VERIFICATION, BIOLOGICAL WARFARE, CHEMICAL WARFARE, AGREEMENTS, DISARMAMENT.
Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE