Accession Number : ADA314280

Title :   The Strategic Use of Military Force: Was the Strategic Use of Force in the Late 19th and the Early 20th Century A Model for the U.S. Army and Operations Other Than War?

Descriptive Note : Monograhy rept.,

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MIL ITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Cox, Alexander A.

PDF Url : ADA314280

Report Date : 30 APR 1996

Pagination or Media Count : 59

Abstract : The objective of this monograph is to first, discern whether the lessons learned from historical cases can be used today, second, develop possible solutions for the operational problems of our most recent deployment into Haiti by considering the lessons learned from the units in the historical models; and, thirdly, to evaluate those successful operations and the means by which they achieved success. A comparative analysis of historical models will be conducted to determine the characteristics of their successes and failures. Once these characteristics have been outlined, the most recent U.S. deployment to Haiti will be analyzed to see if these characteristics are applicable there. This comparative analysis will thus extract useful lessons for today's deployments; drawing parallels to current operations where relevant. The cases selected for the study were the British Army and its small wars, the U.S. Marine Corps and its small wars and operations short of war, and the U.S. Army and its Operations Other Than War (OOTW). The monograph first defines Operations Other Than War, Low Intensity Conflicts, Operations Short of War and Small Wars using the British and the Marine Corps Small Wars manuals, FM 100-20, studies, reports, etc. Once the main object of the monograph was defined, its traits or characteristics were applied to the case studies. The outcome of the comparative analysis lead to the conclusion that all the cases had certain traits in common and that operations other than war are nothing new to any of the cases discussed, in particular, the U.S. Army. The monograph concludes with lessons learned. In all the cases, it is very obvious that the same types of operations are being conducted. The British Army and the United States Marines are held up as a prime examples for the major lessons to take away, that is, they are learning organizations that are capable

Descriptors :   *MILITARY HISTORY, *LESSONS LEARNED, *MILITARY ASSISTANCE, *STRATEGIC WARFARE, *ARMY OPERATIONS, *LIMITED WARFARE, MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES), MILITARY OPERATIONS, DEPLOYMENT, POLITICAL SCIENCE, LEADERSHIP, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY DOCTRINE, MODIFICATION, COMPARISON, PROBLEM SOLVING, CASE STUDIES, MARINE CORPS PERSONNEL, MILITARY PLANNING, GREAT BRITAIN, LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT, HAITI.

Subject Categories : Humanities and History
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE