Accession Number : ADA314675

Title :   Surprise Attack. The Case of the Yom-Kippur War.

Descriptive Note : Research rept. Aug 95-Aug 96,

Corporate Author : INDUSTRIAL COLL OF THE ARMED FORCES WASHINGTON DC

Personal Author(s) : Chorev, Moni

PDF Url : ADA314675

Report Date : 1996

Pagination or Media Count : 31

Abstract : The issue of strategic surprise and specially the subject of surprise attack are some of the most complex problems that policymakers, militaries and intelligence analysts have to face. This is particularly true for states such as Israel, as it was demonstrated during the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Israel was taken by surprise which effected the beginning of the war, as well as the final results. From the Israeli perspective the basic problem was rooted in the imbalance between the size of the Arab and the Israeli military and the asymmetry seen from a geographical perspective. The tDF (Israeli defense forces) is primarily based on reserve forces, whereas the Arab militaries are mainly active. Therefor the deployment of the Israeli reserves depends on early warning, a decision of mobilization and its execution. Moreover, Israel has no strategic depth and its vital objectives are very close to the borders. These factors indicate the significance of the surprise attack and the need for intelligence warning, as a fundamental issue in the national security doctrine.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY STRATEGY, *DECISION MAKING, *DEFENSE SYSTEMS, *MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *STRATEGIC WARFARE, ISRAEL, MILITARY RESERVES, WARFARE, INTELLIGENCE, NATIONAL SECURITY, MOBILIZATION, ATTACK, ASYMMETRY, GEOGRAPHY, ANALYSTS, DOCTRINE, EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS, WARNING SYSTEMS, ISRAELIS.

Subject Categories : Defense Systems
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE