Accession Number : ADA324469
Title : Toetjes,
Corporate Author : STANFORD UNIV CA DEPT OF COMPUTER SCIENCE
Personal Author(s) : Feder, Tomas
PDF Url : ADA324469
Report Date : JUN 1988
Pagination or Media Count : 16
Abstract : A number is secretly chosen from the interval (0, 1), and n players try in turn to guess this number. When the secret number is revealed, the player with the closest guess wins. We describe an optimal strategy for a version of this game. We have shown that a simple zero-sum game in which all players play independently so as to maximize their own payoff can be viewed, under certain conditions, as a game in which the players cooperate to minimize the payoff of the last player. Furthermore, this approach is helpful in developing an optimal strategy for the game. An interesting question is whether this principle can be applied to a broader family of zero-sum games.
Descriptors : *GAME THEORY, OPTIMIZATION, STRATEGY, MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS.
Subject Categories : Theoretical Mathematics
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE