Accession Number : ADA325123

Title :   Operational Art in the Success of the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign.

Descriptive Note : Final rept.,

Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI

Personal Author(s) : Mallette, James R., Jr

PDF Url : ADA325123

Report Date : 06 FEB 1997

Pagination or Media Count : 20

Abstract : LS.Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to answer the question: in operational art terms, why was the Malayan Counterinsurgency Campaign successful? The following facets of operational art are examined in relation to this: critical factors for both the insurgents and the British; operational intelligence of the British; operational command and control of the British; and the desired end-state o% the British. It is concluded that the 'Briggs Plan,' which was implemented in 1950, was the main source of the British success. It contained an intuitive appreciation of critical factors, operational intelligence and operational command and control. The guarantee of Malayan independence also played a large part in the British success. Finally, a warning is given that this paper does not give a prescription for success in counterinsurgency. It only gives a method of analyzing the problem of counterinsurgency which may lead to success.

Descriptors :   *MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, *COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS, *COUNTERINSURGENCY, SOURCES, INTELLIGENCE, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, INSURGENCY.

Subject Categories : Military Intelligence
      Undersea and Antisubmarine Warfare

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE