Accession Number : ADA326200
Title : Stability in South Asia,
Corporate Author : RAND CORP SANTA MONICA CA
Personal Author(s) : Tellis, Ashley J.
PDF Url : ADA326200
Report Date : 1997
Pagination or Media Count : 91
Abstract : This research effort seeks to understand the logic and prospect of deterrence breakdown in South Asia. It examines the nature of the security competition between India and Pakistan; the military capabilities of both states and the impact of such capabilities on decisions relating to war and peace; the national strategies of both countries and how those strategies contribute to the ongoing competition; and the key indicators that the intelligence community, and DCSINT analysts in particular, should focus on when tracking the problem of South Asian instability.
Descriptors : *NATIONAL SECURITY, *MILITARY CAPABILITIES, *DETERRENCE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, INDIA, PAKISTAN, WARFARE, MILITARY STRATEGY, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), TRACKING, SOUTH ASIA.
Subject Categories : Military Forces and Organizations
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE