Accession Number : ADA326827
Title : Nuclear Strategy, Deterrence, Compellence, and Risk(y?) Management: Thomas Schelling Meets Joint Vision 2010,
Corporate Author : ANSER ARLINGTON VA
Personal Author(s) : Tomes, Robert R.
PDF Url : ADA326827
Report Date : 06 JUN 1997
Pagination or Media Count : 36
Abstract : This paper does criticize 2010's vision (or lack thereof) because it seems too focused on technology and too eager to uphold deterrence as the core of post Cold War international security without providing an explanation as to how deterrence will be attuned to regional conflict. To its credit, 2010 does combine deterrence with other military strategies in order to cast a wide net. However, there has been little in the way of declared deterrence strategy that addresses changes in the structure of international security affairs. The following critique of nuclear strategy and deterrence theory should not be mistaken for an argument paralleling that of John Mueller or other revisionists who suggest that nuclear weapons were or are irrelevant in international politics. Opposing Mueller, it links a review of the strategy of nuclear deterrence with an analysis of the role nuclear weapons played in past, present and future global political military affairs.
Descriptors : *NUCLEAR WARFARE, *INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, *CONFLICT, *DETERRENCE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, NATIONAL SECURITY, COMBAT READINESS, THREAT EVALUATION, GEOPOLITICS, ARMS CONTROL, EAST WEST RELATIONS.
Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE