Accession Number : ADA328177

Title :   Operational Art: An Analysis of Britain's Southwest Asia Campaign in World War I.

Descriptive Note : Final rept.,

Corporate Author : NAVAL WAR COLL NEWPORT RI JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPT

Personal Author(s) : Bishop, Harold F., III

PDF Url : ADA328177

Report Date : 16 MAY 1997

Pagination or Media Count : 22

Abstract : Although there exist a wide variety of opinions on why Britain chose to commit assets to the Mediterranean and Mesopotamian regions, it is most probable that Britain viewed Russia's capitulation as a serious threat to the western front. It would severely affect the balance of power in the west, giving Germany the opportunity to break the stalemate that existed there. With this in mind, Britain launched four operations in the Southwest Asia theater (Egypt (Suez), Gallipoli, Arabia, and Mesopotamia) to relieve the pressure on the eastern front and to protect vital interests in the regions. Britain's concept of opening a southern front to threaten Germany was potentially sound. With successes in the south, it would have been possible for the allies to avoid the massive amounts of casualties that were resulting from the war of attrition on the western front. But the southwest Asian campaign was marred by disastrous results in major operations that did not serve, directly or indirectly, either the national or theater strategic objectives. Further analysis of operational art principles will explain why Britain failed in this campaign and allow us to view an operational scheme that might better have served Britain and her allies.

Descriptors :   *WARFARE, *SOUTHWEST ASIA, *UNITED KINGDOM, MILITARY OPERATIONS, MILITARY STRATEGY, THEATER LEVEL OPERATIONS, EGYPT, ATTRITION, GERMANY, CASUALTIES, RUSSIA, BALANCE OF POWER, ARABIA, MEDITERRANEAN SEA ISLANDS.

Subject Categories : Government and Political Science
      Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE