Accession Number : ADA569330

Title :   Lost Unconventional Warfare Lessons from the Yugoslav Front

Descriptive Note : Monograph

Corporate Author : ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES

Personal Author(s) : Adorjan, Michael H

PDF Url : ADA569330

Report Date : 06 Dec 2012

Pagination or Media Count : 54

Abstract : During the early years of the Cold War, the United States Army developed the new doctrine of Unconventional Warfare. This doctrine focused on U.S. soldiers working through and with indigenous guerrilla units to achieve tactical successes in support of the larger theater campaign. However, these early doctrine writers failed to incorporate three key lessons from the guerrilla war fought in Yugoslavia (1941-1945). The lessons were the selection and employment of the right people as advisors, the effective employment of guerrillas (who have a different agenda), and setting the conditions for effective demobilization of the guerrilla force. These overlooked lessons offered a more comprehensive approach in terms of advising, employing, and then demobilizing the guerrilla units in support of U.S. military objectives. The lost lessons provided valuable planning considerations for future advisory units. Through these lessons, U.S. advisors can prepare to work with robust guerrilla organizations that are not solely dependent on U.S. logistical, moral, or political support.

Descriptors :   *INDIGENOUS POPULATION, *LESSONS LEARNED, *MILITARY ADVISORS, *MILITARY DOCTRINE, *SECOND WORLD WAR, *UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, *YUGOSLAVIA, ADVISORY ACTIVITIES, ARMY, CASE STUDIES, COLD WAR, COMMUNISM, GUERRILLA WARFARE, MILITARY HISTORY, MILITARY TACTICS, UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, USSR

Subject Categories : Humanities and History
      Unconventional Warfare

Distribution Statement : APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE